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ABSTRACT 
Within law and legal scholarship there are different models of legal personality and legal 
capacity. The most well known of these emphasises individual rationality, and is distilled into 
the medico-legal ĐoŶĐept of ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛.  In connection with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) a new approach to legal personality is being 
developed, emphasizing relationships of support and recognition of universal legal 
capacity.  ‘eĐeŶt sĐholaƌship oŶ ďoth ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛ aŶd C‘PD appƌoaĐhes to legal ĐapaĐitǇ 
have drawn from feminist writings on relational autonomy.  In this paper, I use this scholarship 
on relational autonomy to explore the differences between these approaches to legal 
capacity.  I argue that the approach connected with the CRPD offers a refreshing take on the 
importance of relationships of support in exercising legal capacity.  However, despite their 
pronounced differences, especially in relation to the legitimacy of coercion, there are 
remarkable similarities in the underlying challenges for each approach: the extent to which 
otheƌs ĐaŶ ͚kŶoǁ͛ ouƌ autheŶtiĐ aŶd autoŶoŵous selǀes, aŶd the iŶeǆtƌiĐaďle ƌelatioŶships of 
power that all forms of legal capacity are embedded within. 
INTRODUCTION 
Law and legal scholarship recognizes a diverse family of legal practices concerned with the concepts 
of ͚legal peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ aŶd ͚legal ĐapaĐitǇ͛, which govern whether and how different entities may enjoy 
legal rights and duties (Tur, 1987).  Naffine (2003) describes how different models of legal personality 
and legal capacity hinge on different metaphysical prerequisites, and have different normative 
implications for the kinds of rights and duties different legal entities may enjoy and how they may 
exercise them.  In its barest sense, legal personality is simply a functional placeholder that could be 
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occupied by any entity that bears some kind of right or duty.  Human rights approaches connect legal 
personality to any human, regardless of their individual capacities.  The most prized form of legal 
peƌsoŶalitǇ is teƌŵed the ͚ƌespoŶsiďle suďjeĐt͛ ďǇ NaffiŶe (p. 362-364)—the ͞classic contractor͟ who 
is ͞rational and therefore responsible͟, can sue and be sued, can be held liable for his actions, and is 
considered autonomous.  
This ͚ƌespoŶsiďle suďjeĐt͛ is distilled iŶto the ŵediĐo-legal concept of ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛, which refers 
to the ability to make a particular decision; and iŶ those aƌeas ǁheƌe a peƌsoŶ is fouŶd to laĐk ͚ŵeŶtal 
ĐapaĐitǇ͛ third parties may make decisions on their behalf in their best interests.  The Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (MCA) of England and Wales is a well-known example of a mental capacity law.1  While this 
approach was itself considered visionary only a decade or so ago, it is now being challenged by an 
emerging new model of legal personality and legal capacity, connected with Article 12 of the United 
Nations (2006) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In its more radical form, 
this ŵodel eŶtiƌelǇ diǀoƌĐes legal ĐapaĐitǇ fƌoŵ ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛ appƌoaĐhes.  It is grounded in the 
social model of disability, which views disability as resulting from the interaction between a peƌsoŶ͛s 
individual make-up ;iŶĐludiŶg aŶǇ ͚iŵpaiƌŵeŶt͛ theǇ ŵaǇ haǀeͿ ǁith theiƌ soĐial eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.  The 
social model eŵphasises addƌessiŶg ďaƌƌieƌs aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal adaptatioŶs, ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚fiǆiŶg͛ oƌ 
͚ĐuƌiŶg͛ iŶdiǀiduals (Oliver, 1990; Shakespeare, 2013). 
This new approach tƌeats a peƌsoŶ͛s ageŶĐǇ as shaped or even constituted by their environment and 
relationships with others.  Instead of casting ͚ŵeŶtal iŶĐapaĐitǇ͛ as an individual deficit, resulting in a 
loss of legal capacity, it calls for the provision of whatever support is necessary to ensure that disabled 
people are able to exercise full legal capacity on an equal basis with others, and addressing 
discriminatory attitudes and barriers that might limit the recognition and exercise of legal capacity by 
disabled persons.  This approach to legal personality is sometimes kŶoǁŶ as the ͚suppoƌt paƌadigŵ͛, 
oƌ a paƌadigŵ of ͚universal legal ĐapaĐitǇ͛.  The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (2014) endorsed this approach in its General Comment on Article 12 CRPD.  The 
General Comment maintains that Article 12 prohibits the impositioŶ of ͚suďstitute deĐisioŶs͛ oŶ 
people with disabilities, requiring instead that they are given access to the support they need to 
exercise their legal capacity in accordance with their will and preferences.  There is growing concern 
that the MCA contravenes Article 12 CRPD (Bartlett, 2012a; Martin, 2014; Richardson, 2013). 
                                                          
1 This approach can also be found in several human rights instruments from the 1990s (e.g. Council of 
Europe 1999; United Nations, 1991), and in many other national laws.   
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In order to unpack the emergence of this new paradigm of legal personality and legal capacity, this 
paper contrasts the metaphysical foundations aŶd Ŷoƌŵatiǀe iŵpliĐatioŶs of ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛ aŶd 
͚suppoƌt paƌadigŵ͛ appƌoaĐhes, using case studies to illustrate their differences.  It draws from 
relational theories of autonomy, which are increasingly invoked within the developing literature on 
each approach.  By examining each approach through the lens of relational autonomy (RA), it becomes 
apparent that they have importantly different metaphysical underpinnings, which have implications 
for how they translate into legal frameworks and everyday life.  Laws like the MCA are primarily based 
on the idea that mental capacity is the property of an individual, and this approach struggles to 
produce clear and consistent principles for accommodating the influences of others – both positive 
and negative – on decision making.  Mental capacity approaches emphasise the importance of 
interventions that can enhance individual decision making, but these interventions, which ostensibly 
aim to promote autonomy, can be remarkably coercive.  This is an important difference fƌoŵ ͚support 
paƌadigŵ͛ appƌoaĐhes. 
The support paradigm literature offers a new take on the importance of autonomy over and within 
relationships; a perspective that is often neglected in the literature on the MCA.  However, its 
emphasis on consensual support raises difficult questions about how this approach can manage 
situations of risk where a person rejects support, or situations of exploitation, abuse and undue 
influence by supporters.  Responses in the literature to these ͚haƌd Đases͛ aƌe disĐussed. 
Both approaches are concerned with the boundaries of personhood, and responsibility for, and 
ownership of, decisions.  Despite their pronounced differences, especially in relation to the legitimacy 
of coercion, there are remarkable similarities in the underlying challenges for each approach: the 
eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh otheƌs ĐaŶ ͚kŶoǁ͛ ouƌ autheŶtiĐ aŶd autoŶoŵous selǀes, aŶd the iŶeǆtƌiĐaďle 
relationships of power that all forms of legal capacity are embedded within.  This paper does not aim 
to resolve all the complex questions raised by these approaches to legal capacity; rather it hopes to 
promote further reflection on their metaphysical foundations and normative implications. 
THEORIES OF RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
According to contemporary feminist thought, for better or worse, our acts and decisions, values and 
beliefs, our very identities, are profoundly influenced by our relationships with others. This idea sits 
in tension with liberal philosophies that idealise moral and political subjects as self-sufficient and 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt of otheƌs͛ iŶflueŶĐe; suďjeĐts ǁho aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚autoŶoŵous͛.  This feminist intuition 
has inspired a diverse family of critiques that argue that autonomy itself has social and relational 
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dimensions.  These theories of autonomy have had a profound impact on the new approaches to legal 
personality and legal capacity that provide the focus for this paper. 
Beyond agreement that autonomy is valuable, but cannot be divorced from relational and social 
conditions, RA approaches are very diverse (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Stoljar, 2013).  Causal accounts 
emphasise the importance of external causal conditions, such as relationships with parents, teachers 
and friends, that provide the necessary ͚support aŶd guidaŶĐe͛ for the development of autonomy 
(Nedelsky, 1989, p. 12). Others, like Oshana (2006), go further, and argue that social and relational 
conditions are constitutive of autonomy; ƌegaƌdless of a peƌsoŶ͛s iŶdiǀidual ŵake-up, they are not 
autonomous unless certain social and relational conditions are satisfied.  OshaŶa͛s ĐoŶstitutiǀe 
account is more tolerant of non-ĐoŶseŶsual iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs to ͚ ƌesĐue͛ iŶdiǀiduals fƌoŵ oppƌessiǀe soĐial 
circumstances, even if they themselves have chosen to live in such circumstances.  For this reason it 
has attracted criticism by scholars who prefer models of autonomy that place a greater emphasis on 
individual capacities for reasoning and reflection (Christman, 2004; Holroyd, 2009;). 
RA approaches can also encompass symbolic critiƋues of WesteƌŶ Đultuƌe͛s idealisatioŶ of a 
͚ŵasĐuliŶe͛ ideal of autoŶoŵǇ - atomistic, self-sufficient, rational and unemotional (Brown, 2002; 
Code, 1991; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Scott, 1996).  Much of the ͚suppoƌt paƌadigŵ͛ scholarship 
could be viewed as engaging in a similar symbolic critique (e.g. Quinn & Arstein-Kerslake 2012Ϳ.  ͚Ethic 
of Đaƌe͛ approaches, that emphasise the value of relationships of care and interdependency, are also 
sometimes connected with RA (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000: 8–10; Herring, 2013a: 72).  However, some 
disability scholars have criticized the ͞ethic of care͟ as being insufficiently attentive to rights and 
power relations within relationships of care (Herring, 2013; Shakespeare, 2013).  Tensions between 
͚ethiĐ of Đaƌe͛ aŶd ͚ƌights ďased͛ appƌoaĐhes to suppoƌt can be discerned in the mental capacity and 
support paradigm literature. 
Theories of autonomy have an important influence on models of legal personality.  Individual liberal 
models are most obǀiouslǇ assoĐiated ǁith NaffiŶe͛s ͚ƌespoŶsiďle suďjeĐt͛, but RA approaches are 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ iŶǀoked iŶ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ǁith ďoth ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛ aŶd ͚suppoƌt paƌadigŵ͛ appƌoaĐhes to 
legal capacity.  Because of their diverse metaphysical, ethical and political underpinnings, RA 
approaches can be used to advocate for very different positions.  This is reflected in the very different 
ways they are used in the literature on legal personality and capacity: on the one hand, RA approaches 
are being used to rehabilitate mental capacity models, and on the other they are being used to reject 
them altogether.  Legal scholars should exercise caution when praying in aid ͚ƌelatioŶal͛ approaches; 
because of their diversity it is far from self-evident how these should translate into legal frameworks 
or everyday life. 
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MENTAL CAPACITY AND RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
Although ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛ is Ŷot sǇŶoŶǇŵous ǁith moral and political philosophies of autonomy 
(Owen et al, 2009), in many respects its legal functions are closely analogous.  Christman and Anderson 
(2005, p.3) describe liberal understandings of autonomy as meaning that freedom and responsibility 
flow from a person satisfying competence and authenticity requirements.  Mental capacity law is 
structured similarly: a person is accorded legal rights and responsibilities only insofar as they are found 
to be competent and their decisions are authentically theirs.  However, aŶ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of the MCA͛s 
case law reveals that the courts struggle to reconcile the influence of relationships to competence and 
authenticity requirements connected with mental capacity, resulting in complex and sometimes 
contradictory rulings. 
Value neutral or substantive autonomy? 
Under the MCA, a person is considered unable to make a decision if they are unable to understand, 
retain, or use or weigh the relevant information – including about the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences – or to communicate their decision.2  This ͚functional͛ approach was preferred to tests 
based on the outcome of a decision3 (Law Commission, 1991), and the MCA cautions that a person is 
Ŷot to ďe ƌegaƌded as ͚iŶĐapaďle͛ ŵeƌelǇ ďeĐause theǇ ŵake aŶ uŶǁise deĐisioŶ.4  This resembles a 
pƌoĐeduƌal ͚ǀalue Ŷeutƌal͛ approach to autonomy, rather than substantive approaches that require 
people to hold certain values or decide in a particular way in order to be regarded as autonomous 
(Christman & Anderson, 2005; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p.13; Stoljar, 2013).  However several 
commentators argue that mental capacity does, inevitably, contain substantive commitments 
(Banner, 2012; Charland, 2001; Craigie, 2013; Freyenhagen & O'Shea, 2013; Holroyd, 2012).  Empirical 
research suggests that assessors find it very difficult to distiŶguish ďetǁeeŶ ͚ iŶĐapaĐitous͛ aŶd ͚ uŶǁise͛ 
decisions (Emmett et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2012).  Some argue that the value judgments underlying 
mental capacity assessments should be made more transparent (Freyenhagen & O͛“hea, ϮϬϭϯ; KoŶg, 
2014). 
AĐkŶoǁledgiŶg that ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ assessŵeŶt is Ŷot ͚ǀalue Ŷeutƌal͛ ƌaises the ƋuestioŶ of whose 
values should inform the assessment – the peƌsoŶ͛s oǁŶ, the assessoƌs, oƌ ǁideƌ soĐietal ǀalues?  
                                                          
2 sϯ;ϭͿ MCA. Please Ŷote, that a peƌsoŶ ǁho is ͚uŶaďle to ŵake a deĐisioŶ͛ is oŶlǇ ƌegaƌded as laĐkiŶg ŵeŶtal 
capacity if certain causal conditions contained within s2(1) MCA are also satisfied; this is discussed below. 
3 Outcome tests might, for example, consider the ͚ƌeasoŶaďleŶess͛ of a deĐisioŶ. 
4 s1(4) MCA 
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Several RA approaches to mental capacity argue that it should be assessed by reference to the 
peƌsoŶ͛s oǁŶ ǀalues; the implications of this are discussed below. 
Internalism or externalism? 
O͛“hea ;ϮϬϭϭͿ aŶd AshleǇ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ĐhaƌaĐteƌize accounts of autonomy as either internalist – requiring 
oŶlǇ ͚iŶteƌŶal͛ decision making capacities, authenticity conditions and attitudes to self to be satisfied 
– or externalist, requiring ĐeƌtaiŶ eǆteƌŶal ͚eŶaďliŶg ĐoŶditioŶs͛ to be satisfied such as freedom from 
duress, manipulation, coercion and domination.  Externalist accounts – like OshaŶa͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ - mean 
that a person who satisfies internal criteria for autonomy could still be regarded as non-autonomous 
because of their oppressive relationships or social circumstances.  As noted above, such accounts can 
be controversial if they endorse non-consensual interventions in situations where a person is 
ĐoŶsideƌed ͚oppƌessed͛ ďut still satisfies ͚iŶteƌŶal͛ Đƌiteƌia foƌ autoŶoŵǇ (Christman, 2004; Holroyd, 
2009).  Questions of internalism and externalism also arise for mental capacity, and can inspire similar 
ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsies aďout the appƌopƌiateŶess of iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs ǁheƌe people ŵaǇ ďe ͚iŶĐoŵpeteŶt͛ oƌ 
͚ĐoŵpeteŶt͛ ďut foƌ theiƌ ƌelatioŶships ǁith paƌtiĐulaƌ iŶdiǀiduals. 
In some senses, the MCA resembles ͚iŶteƌŶalist͛ approaches to autonomy, as it includes an additional 
causation requirement whereby people are only treated as lacking mental capacity if they are unable 
to make a decision ͞because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or 
brain͟5.  This causation requirement encodes a ͚ŵediĐal͛ oƌ ͚iŶdiǀidual͛ ŵodel of incapacity, 
contrasting with the social models of disability that underpin the support paradigm.  This causation 
requirement takes the courts into tricky metaphysical territory: how should they distinguish between 
the entangled effects of impairment, social surroundings and biography?6  Some disabled people have 
successfully argued that they had mental capacity, by attributing decision making difficulties to other 
causes than an impairment – for example a relationship with a predatory sex offender7, religious 
beliefs8 oƌ a ͚ ĐhalleŶgiŶg peƌsoŶalitǇ͛.9   Paradoxically, given these uses, this may also constitute a form 
of disability discrimination (Carson, 1993; Martin, 2014). 
                                                          
5 s2(1) MCA 
6 For an example of the difficulties, see: Re PB [2014] EWCOP 14 
7 PC & Anor v City of York Council [2013] EWCA Civ 478  
8 Re P (capacity to tithe inheritance) [2014] EWHC B14 (COP) 
9 Wandsworth Clinical Commissioning Group v IA [2014] EWHC 990 (COP) 
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Tensions between internalist and externalist accounts of mental capacity can also be observed in a 
seƌies of Đases ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ĐoŶseŶt to seǆ.  PuďliĐ authoƌities haǀe ƌepeatedlǇ aƌgued that a peƌsoŶ͛s 
mental capacity to consent to sex is affected by relationships with sexual partners, but the courts have 
resisted this interpretation out of concern that it could result in paternalistic and intrusive ͞vetting͟ 
of potential sexual partners (Series, 2015).10  These rulings have been criticised by feminist theorists 
for not attending to the relational dimensions of decision making (Clough, 2014; Herring & Wall, 2014).  
Yet if mental capacity assessments did take into account the deleterious effects of particular 
relationships this could permit more paternalistic interventions, evoking similar controversies to 
eǆteƌŶalist ĐoŶstitutiǀe appƌoaĐhes to autoŶoŵǇ like OshaŶa͛s, which permit coercive interventions 
on the basis of the properties of oppressive relationships. 
Relationships as threats to autonomy 
It would not be correct, however, to say that the MCA is never attentive to relational aspects of 
decision making.  On a number of occasions, the courts have authorized interventions to restrict 
contact with third parties who are said to exercise such a negative influence over a peƌsoŶ͛s decision 
making that theǇ laĐk ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ.  IŶ soŵe Đases, the ͚ƌesĐued͛ iŶdiǀiduals adaŵaŶtlǇ opposed 
such interventions11, in others the peƌsoŶ͛s ͚tƌue͛ ǀieǁs ǁeƌe disputed.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, in LBX v K, L was 
said to be ͞ poorly equipped to resist͟ the overbearing influence of his father, and he voiced conflicting 
preferences to different people.12  Once removed from the care of his father, he expressed a 
preference not to see him. 
In London Borough of Redbridge v G,13 a local authority received numerous safeguarding referrals 
about a 94 year old woman called G, concerning two individuals who had moved into her home.  
Witnesses described seeing C and F shouting and screaming at G14, isolating her from family and 
friends and felt that she was scared of them.  C and F had told G that if she asked them to leave she 
would be placed in a care home, and the local authority was unable to convince her of their plans to 
                                                          
10 IM v LM [2014] EWCA Civ 37.  A very different approach is taken in the criminal sphere; see R v Cooper [2009] 
UKHL 42. 
11 A Primary Care Trust v P [2009] EW Misc 10 (EWCOP); A Local Authority v WMA & Ors [2013] EWHC 2580 
(COP) 
12 LBX v K, L, M [2013] EWHC 3230 (Fam), §15 
13 [2014] EWHC 17 (COP)  
14 One alleged they had witnessed her being physically shaken, but the court made no finding of fact regarding 
this allegation. 
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support her to remain at home.  At various points G had asked ͞for some government authority to 
intervene on her behalf͟15, and had told a doctor and independent social worker that she was like ͞ the 
fly in the spider's web͟16.  Yet in the presence of C and F, including in the courtroom and before 
journalists, G insisted that she wanted them to remain.  The court concluded that G lacked the mental 
capacity to decide (inter alia) whether the individuals should continue to live with her.  It held that she 
was ͞paralysed with fear by the threats regarding her removal to a care-home͟.17  The court held that 
her true wishes and feelings were hard to discern; ŶotǁithstaŶdiŶg G͛s oďjeĐtioŶs in court, it 
authorised the removal of the individuals from her home, and a care plan to support her to remain 
there and be re-integrated into her church and social world.   
These rulings suggest that – outside the sphere of consent to sex at least – the courts treat mental 
capacity as being partially constituted by freedom from oppressive relationships with others. 
Relationships as enabling autonomy 
The RA literature also emphasises that relationships can foster autonomy, through providing 
appropriate support (Nedelsky, 1989).  Analogously, the MCA requires that ͞A person is not to be 
treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken 
without success͟.18  This is soŵetiŵes kŶoǁŶ as the ͚ suppoƌt pƌiŶĐiple͛, ďut it diffeƌs iŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ways 
to the support paradigm connected with the CRPD, discussed below.  The MCA Code of Practice 
suggests selecting an appropriate time and place to conduct the assessment, presenting information 
in different ways, and involving others who may be able to help them make a decision (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007, Chapter 3).19  Courts have required measures such as providing sex 
education20 oƌ settiŶg out all the optioŶs foƌ a peƌsoŶ ƌatheƌ thaŶ staƌtiŶg ǁith a ͚ďlaŶk canvas͛21 to 
help a person attain mental capacity. 
                                                          
15 London Borough of Redbridge v G & Ors [2014] EWHC 485 (COP) §17 
16 London Borough of Redbridge v G & Ors [2014] EWHC 17 (COP), §10 
17 n13, §79 
18 s1(3) MCA.  See also s3(2) which requires that information is presented in a way that is appropriate to a 
peƌsoŶ͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstances. 
19 Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Bill (Northern Ireland) 2014 explicitly codifies these provisions. 
20 D Borough Council v AB [2011] EWHC 101 (COP) 
21 CC v KK and STCC [2012] EWHC 2136 (COP) 
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The MCA͛s support principle is framed in the passive voice: it is not immediately obvious who must 
provide this support, and what that support should look like.  The duty will fall upon whoever relies 
upon an assertion that a person lacks mental capacity.  In some cases this might be people nominated 
under Lasting Powers of Attorney (LPA)22 or court appointed deputies23, but the vast majority of health 
aŶd ǁelfaƌe deĐisioŶs ǁill ďe ŵade uŶdeƌ the MCA͛s ͚geŶeƌal defeŶĐe͛.24 This codified the common 
law position25 that a person who performs an act of care or treatment in the best interests of a person 
who lacks mental capacity will have the same protection from liability that they would have had if the 
person had consented to it.  Thus support under the MCA is not structured holistically – it is atomised 
across different decisions and dispersed over a large number of disparate actors who might rely upon 
the general defence.   
Peƌhaps ďeĐause the MCA Đouples ͚suppoƌt͛ duties to ǁhoeǀeƌ asseƌts ŵeŶtal iŶĐapaĐitǇ, the RA 
literature on the MCA focuses almost exclusively on support in the context of mental capacity 
assessment.  Mackenzie and Rogers (2013) describe mental capacity as inherently ͞dialogical͟, as 
dialogue is required foƌ assessoƌs to distiŶguish ďetǁeeŶ ͚uŶǁise͛ aŶd ͚iŶĐapaĐitous͛ deĐisioŶs.  They 
argue that this dialogue can itself foster authentic and autonomous decision making.  They argue26 
that the MCA endorses a diachronic conception of authentic agency, requiring capacity assessors to 
ĐoŶsideƌ ǁhetheƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s deĐisioŶ is ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith theiƌ loŶg-standing values, beliefs and 
commitments.  They suggest that ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ assessoƌs ĐaŶ pƌoǀide the ŶeĐessaƌǇ ͚soĐial 
sĐaffoldiŶg͛ to promote diachronically coherent decisions.  ͚HeƌŵeŶeutiĐ͛ appƌoaĐhes also emphasise 
the role of dialogue in mental capacity assessment in promoting authentic decisions, through 
seaƌĐhiŶg foƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s ͚tƌue͛ ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ verbal and non-verbal communication, and affording the 
person ͚the possibility of developing a personal narrative͛ (Benaroyo & Widdershoven, 2004, p. 305; 
cited by Donnelly, 2010).  Similarly, Banner and Szmukler (2013) take inspiration from Davidson (1973) 
                                                          
22 s9-14 MCA 
23 s16 MCA 
24 s5-6 MCA 
25 Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1; [1991] UKHL 1 
26 Citing Westlund (2009) and Taylor (1989). 
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to aƌgue that assessoƌs should eǆploƌe a peƌsoŶ͛s ǀalues aŶd ďeliefs to ideŶtifǇ ͚iŶĐapaĐitǇ͛ ǁithiŶ the 
peƌsoŶ͛s oǁŶ ŵoƌal fƌaŵe of ƌefeƌeŶĐe.27 
There is much wisdom in exhortations to tƌǇ to uŶdeƌstaŶd otheƌ people͛s values and frames of 
meaning, and that dialogue can promote authentic and diachronically coherent decision making.  
However, there is little acknowledgement in these RA accounts that mental capacity assessment is 
͞embedded in unequal power relations between professionals and individuals͟ (Beaupert & Steele, 
2014).  This is no ordinary dialogue: assessors must – on these accounts – at some point come to a 
ǀieǁ as to a peƌsoŶ͛s ͚tƌue͛ oƌ autheŶtiĐ ǀalues aŶd ďeliefs, and assess their decisions against these.  
DialogiĐal appƌoaĐhes thus iŵpliĐitlǇ ĐoŶfeƌ upoŶ ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ assessoƌs ͚episteŵiĐ pƌiǀilege͛ to 
know a peƌsoŶ͛s ͚tƌue͛ ǀalues aŶd ďeliefs and how these have influenced their reasoning.  Yet as 
Skowron (2014, citing Kittay, 2009) comments, there are reasons for requiring ͞epistemic modesty͟ 
here, being clear about the liŵits of assessoƌs͛ kŶoǁledge. 
Stefan (1992-1993) describes capacity as ͞a value judgment arising from an individual's conversation 
or communication with individuals in positions of power͟, and failures of communication are 
attributed only to the less powerful side of the dialogue.   The point was eloquently made by LT, who 
exclaimed to her capacity assessor, with palpable frustration, ͞I want to go home – whǇ doŶ͛t Ǉou 
understand that?͟28  Whose is the failing of understanding here?  Problems may arise where a peƌsoŶ͛s 
frame of meaning is difficult to communicate and hard to understand (Carel & Kidd, 2014), especially 
if they live in radically different bodies and social circumstances to assessors.   
These approaches necessarily require the assessed person to engage in dialogue with assessors about 
their values, beliefs and reasoning; little attention has been paid to how this might be experienced.  
Although, as Smzukler (2009. p. 649) suggests, some people may experience this conversation as 
͞therapeutic͟, it is far from clear that all will.   Assessments could easily be experienced as intrusive, 
or as a taǆiŶg deŵaŶd to ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐt a ĐoŶǀiŶĐiŶg Đase͛ (Morgan & Veitch, 2004) in order to retain 
control over matters of great personal significance.  Case law offers several examples of people who 
were found to lack mental capacity by assessors whom they did not like or trust – and thus refused to 
co-operate with – only to be found to have mental capacity by other assessors whom they felt less 
                                                          
27 A similar relational and hermeneutic approach to mental capacity assessment is being developed by Camillia 
Kong as part of a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Oxford (personal communication, 
2014).  A book on this subject is anticipated. 
28 RT v LT & Anor [2010] EWHC 1910 (Fam) §32 
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antipathy towards.29  A relationship of trust cannot always be presumed, and the identity of the 
assessor matters a great deal.   
The RA literature on the MCA typically assumes that clinicians – or sometimes social welfare 
professionals - will play the role of supporting and assessing mental capacity (e.g. Banner & Szmukler, 
2013; Benaroyo & Widdershoven, 2004; Donnelly, 2010: 110; Mackenzie & Rogers, 2013).  Yet 
experience suggests that where mental capacity assessments are conducted by professionals, who 
may have little personal knowledge of the individual, it is harder to support people to make decisions 
(House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA, 2014, para. 70).  By contrast, the support paradigm 
literature connected with the CRPD places a greater emphasis on personal and biographical – rather 
than clinical – knowledge, and the role of families and friends in supporting decision making (Bach & 
Kerzner, 2010).  Involving family and friends may confer practical advantages over the medicalised 
approach to support taken in the MCA literature - people͛s deĐisioŶs aŶd soĐial ǁoƌlds eǆteŶd faƌ 
beyond the clinical.  Herring (2013a, p. 157) argues that mental capacity assessments should routinely 
examine how people make decisions with the support of family and friends. 
This brings us to one of the key instabilities in the MCA͛s tƌeatŵeŶt of suppoƌted decisions.  Whilst on 
the one hand it endorses the idea that decisions can be made with support, too much ͚soĐial 
sĐaffoldiŶg͛ ƌaises douďts aďout ǁheƌe the ͚tƌue͛ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ the deĐisioŶ should lie.  This 
dilemma is starkly illustrated by the case of V v R.30  V sought compensation from a driver who had hit 
her in a road traffic accident, leading to multiple physical injuries and a head injury.  In considering her 
mental capacity to conduct that litigation,31 the court heard that she relied heavily upon her mother 
for advice, and her mother felt she was incapable of making important decisions for herself.  However, 
the court concluded that she had the mental capacity to litigate on the ͞Đleaƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ that she 
ǁould ͚ĐoŶtinue to receive the help, support and advice of her parents.͟32  Yet in a later hearing, a 
different judge concluded that V lacked the mental capacity to make financial decisions because she 
ƌelied so heaǀilǇ oŶ heƌ ŵotheƌ͛s adǀiĐe, saying ͞the guiding person in making the decision was her 
                                                          
29 Wandsworth Clinical Commissioning Group v IA [2014] EWHC 990 (COP); Re JB [2014] EWHC 342 (COP) 
30 Note: This case is a personal injury claim and not a Court of Protection case.  It is possible that a Court of 
Protection judge might take a different approach. 
31 V v R [2011] EWHC 822 (QB) 
32 §29 
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mother.͟33  No principled grounds for reaching different conclusions on very similar facts were 
provided. 
V͛s Đase is another example of a fundamental ambivalence as to whether mental capacity has external 
constitutive elements; in this context the question is how far a person can be regarded as competent 
if they are reliant on their relationships with others to make decisions.  Mental capacity approaches 
tend to draw a sharp distinction over where responsibilities lie; insofar as a person has mental 
capacity, they assume responsibility for the consequences of their decisions, even if harmful.  
DiffiĐulties poteŶtiallǇ aƌise if thiƌd paƌties haǀe a poǁeƌful iŶflueŶĐe oǀeƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg, 
yet are neither responsible nor accountable for its outcome.  Courts may be nervous of recognising 
͚suppoƌted͛ deĐisioŶs ǁheƌe, as uŶdeƌ the MCA, theƌe is no obvious way of monitoring the conduct of 
supporters and holding them accountable.  As we will see, the support paradigm literature connected 
with the CRPD advocates formal frameworks for support, which could address some of these concerns 
and offers more effective legal tools for recognition of shared or complementary responsibilities.  This 
in turn might lead to greater willingness to recognise supported decisions which are highly influenced 
by third parties.  Yet even within the support paradigm, difficult questions can still arise about where 
͚tƌue͛ oƌ ultiŵate ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ deĐisioŶs lies. 
Support and coercion 
A key distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the MCA͛s appƌoaĐh to ͚suppoƌt͛ aŶd the support paradigm connected with 
the CRPD is the extent to which support is consensual.  In a number of cases under the MCA the 
͚suppoƌt pƌiŶĐiple͛ has gƌouŶded iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs that ĐoŶfliĐted ǁith a peƌsoŶ͛s eǆpƌessed ǁishes.  The 
Mental Health Trust v DD is an extreme example of this.34 Following growing concerns by medical 
pƌofessioŶals aŶd soĐial ǁoƌkeƌs aďout DD͛s iŶaďilitǇ to Đaƌe foƌ heƌ ĐhildƌeŶ, fiǀe of ǁhoŵ had ďeeŶ 
removed from her care, and her refusal to engage with ante-natal care in the context of serious 
complications in previous pregnancies, they sought an assessment of her mental capacity to make 
decisions about contraception.  Because DD refused to engage with professionals, the court 
authorised forced eŶtƌǇ to heƌ hoŵe aŶd heƌ ƌeŵoǀal to a health ĐeŶtƌe to ďe giǀeŶ ͚eduĐatioŶ͛ aďout 
contraception and a capacity assessment.35 Later judgments reported that this intervention had put 
                                                          
33 Verlander v Rahman [2012] EWHC 1026 (QB) 
34 The Mental Health Trust & Ors v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 13 
35 The MCA Code of PƌaĐtiĐe states that ͚NoďodǇ ĐaŶ ďe foƌĐed to uŶdeƌgo aŶ assessŵeŶt of ĐapaĐitǇ͛ ;Loƌd 
Chancellor's Office, 2007: [4.59]), however the Code is not legally binding.  Although there must be good reasons 
foƌ depaƌtiŶg fƌoŵ a statutoƌǇ Code͛s guidaŶĐe: R (Munjaz) v. Ashworth Hospital Authority [2005] UKHL 58.  See 
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back efforts to foster co-operation36 and resulted such high levels of anger and frustration that the 
assessment could not be completed.37 
In A Local Authority v TZ38, TZ was found to lack the mental capacity to assess the risks of prospective 
sexual partners.  The court ordered that he be given a named support worker who would oversee a 
͞programme of education and empowerment͟, accompanying him on outings and reminding TZ of 
͞appropriate behaviour͟.39  The plan offered space for TZ to enjoy privacy and the opportunity to make 
͞mistakes͟ in order to learn through experience, but this privacy was closely bounded.  If TZ wished 
to leave his care home and cohabit with somebody, there would be an assessment of his mental 
capacity to make that choice.  If TZ wished to bring a sexual partner back to his care home, they would 
be ͞subject to safeguarding checks to protect other residents͟.40  One wonders if many people could 
initiate sexual relationships under such conditions. 
The cases of DD and TZ reveal the significant potential for hard paternalistic intervention within the 
MCA͛s appƌoaĐh to ͚suppoƌt͛. Superficially, they are based upon a view that coercion and control can 
be used to foster and enhance autonomy; a view that is rejected by Clough (2014), who argues that 
peƌpetuatiŶg a laĐk of ĐhoiĐe aŶd ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s oǁŶ life increases their overall vulnerability.  
They contrast sharply with the approach to support connected with the CRPD; the General Comment 
states that suppoƌt ŵust ďe ďased oŶ the peƌsoŶ͛s ǁill aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes aŶd that the peƌsoŶ ŵust ďe 
able to refuse support (para. 24). 
͚‘elational best interests͛ 
The literature on the MCA has also explored relational dimensions of best interests decisions made on 
behalf of a person who is said to lack mental capacity.  Best interests decision makers must ͞so far as 
reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his ability to 
                                                          
also SBC v PBA and Others [2011] EWHC 2580 (Fam). The Court of Protection can make interim orders under s48 
MCA on the basis that theƌe is ͚ƌeasoŶ to ďelieǀe͛ that a person lacks mental capacity, where no satisfactory 
assessment of mental capacity has yet been undertaken. 
36 The Mental Health Trust & Anor v DD & Anor (No 3) [2014] EWCOP 44, §5 
37 The Mental Health Trust & Ors v DD & Anor [2015] EWCOP 4, §42 
38 A Local Authority v TZ (No. 2) [2014] EWHC 973 (COP); see also the earlier decision in A Local Authority v TZ 
[2013] EWHC 2322 (COP). 
39 §64 
40 §62-71 
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participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him͟.41  They must 
͞consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable͟, the peƌsoŶ͛s past aŶd pƌeseŶt ǁishes, feeliŶgs, ǀalues 
and beliefs.42  They must also, where ͞practicable and appropriate͟, consult with anyone named by 
the person and others involved in caring for them or with an interest in their welfare.43   
Dunn͛s (2008) desĐƌiďes the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚ƌelatioŶal͛ peƌsoŶal kŶoǁledge iŶ ďest iŶteƌests decisions 
made by care workers.  Other scholars have considered how the interests of others can become 
ensnared with those of the individual and will need to be considered (Herring, 2013b; Herring & 
Foster, 2012; Martin et al., 2012).  Some ͚ƌelatioŶal͛ aĐĐounts of best interests have a pronounced 
coercive undertow, however.  A striking example of this is a hypothetical scenario described by Herring 
(2013b, p. 19-20; 2013a, p. 174-5) where he suggests that a person with incontinence problems could 
be subjected to surgery to correct this despite his refusal if his partner found dealing with his 
incontinence ͞unpleasant͟, in order to preserve this important relationship.  Yet scenarios like this are 
precisely why disability rights campaigners emphasise the importance of non-familial sources of 
assistance being available (Campbell, 2008). An equalities perspective would pose the question: is this 
principle that important relationships are to be preserved through coercion to be extended to non-
disabled people as well?  It might be thought that this scenario displays characteristics of oppression 
that are critiqued in many RA accounts. 
͚Best iŶteƌests͛ approaches are rejected in the support paradigm connected with the CRPD for not 
giving sufficient respect to aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ͚ǁill aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes͛ (Jütten, 2014; General Comment, 
para. 18bis).  The Supreme Court recently clarified that best interests requires consideration of 
matters ͞from the patient's point of view͟, but whilst it contains subjective elements it is not a 
substituted judgment approach.44  Some reported best interests decisions do strive to make the 
decision the person would have made for themselves45, but others are explicitly at odds with what the 
                                                          
41 s4(4) MCA 
42 s4(6) MCA 
43 s4(7) MCA 
44 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, §45, §24 
45 For example: Westminster City Council v Sykes [2014] EWHC B9 (COP); PS v LP [2013] EWHC 1106 (COP); United 
Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N [2014] EWCOP 16  
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person presently wants46 or would have wanted.47  The contrasting approach taken by the support 
paradigm of the CRPD is discussed further below. 
LEGAL CAPACITY AND THE SUPPORT PARADIGM UNDER THE CRPD 
The support paradigm aims to offer a new and more ͞cosmopolitan͟ approach to legal capacity, based 
on ideas of ͞shared personhood͟ and an acknowledgement of universal reliance on myriad supports 
to ͞to help us forge our own pathways͟ (Quinn & Arstein-Kerslake 2012. p. 38).  It is characterized by 
atteŵpts to ŵaǆiŵize the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh a peƌsoŶ͛s legal ageŶĐǇ ƌefleĐts their will and preferences, 
regardless of their perceived or actual mental capacity. 
As a sui generis approach to legal subjectivity, the metaphysical and normative underpinnings of the 
support paradigm are still evolving.  In some places in the literature, it appears to rest on a causal 
Đlaiŵ siŵilaƌ to NedelskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ aƌguŵeŶt that autoŶoŵǇ is alǁaǇs, foƌ eǀeƌǇoŶe, depeŶdeŶt upoŶ 
supportive relationships which enable autonomy to develop, and that it is necessary to be given 
opportunities to make decisions, including mistakes, in order to develop autonomy.  Others, like 
Silvers and Francis (2009) appear to be making a stronger constitutive claim: that provided they stand 
in an appropriate relationship with an individual, supporters can satisfy what would ordinarily be 
͚iŶteƌŶal͛ ĐoŵpeteŶĐe Đƌiteƌia suĐh that the peƌsoŶ theŵselves is regarded as autonomous.  On this 
model, third parties serve a ͞prosthetic͟ fuŶĐtioŶ, to ǁhoŵ ͚ĐoŵpeteŶĐe͛ ĐaŶ ďe outsouƌĐed aŶd Ǉet 
decisions still remain authentically the peƌsoŶ͛s oǁŶ.  MetaphǇsiĐallǇ, this raises ĐoŶtested ͚eǆteŶded 
ŵiŶd͛ aƌguŵeŶts iŶ the philosophǇ of ŵiŶd ;disĐussed ďǇ NelsoŶ, ϮϬϬϵͿ, aŶd the ŵetaphǇsiĐs as suĐh 
will not be discussed here.  However, I offer some practical and legal reasons why it may be 
pƌoďleŵatiĐ to tƌeat thiƌd paƌties͛ deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg processes as if theǇ ǁeƌe the peƌsoŶ͛s oǁŶ. 
This section considers the support paradigm by exploring some of the specific practices which have 
been proposed as recognizing and fostering this more cosmopolitan approach to legal capacity, and 
the issues arising therein. 
                                                          
46 For example: The Mental Health Trust & Ors v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 13; GW v A Local Authority & Anor 
[2014] EWCOP 20. 
47 Re JC; D v JC (2012) MHLO 35 (COP) 
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Supported decision making 
BǇ ͚suppoƌted deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg͛, I mean systems of supports where one or more people assist another 
to make a decision and communicate it to others. 48  This could be through helping them to obtain and 
understand information relevant to the decision, talking through the pros and cons of different 
available options, or helping a person to communicate with others.  There is, clearly, considerable 
oǀeƌlap ďetǁeeŶ ͚suppoƌted deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg͛ uŶdeƌ the C‘PD aŶd soŵe of the dialogical approaches 
described above in connection with the MCA.  However, there are some core differences between 
supported decision making under the MCA and the CRPD.   
Support under the CRPD tends to be construed in a much more holistic way than under the MCA; it is 
Ŷot oŶlǇ aǀailaďle ǁheŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ to ŵake a speĐifiĐ decision is called into question, 
but for all and any areas of decision making where a person wants support.  Earlier I highlighted the 
lack of attention paid within the MCA literature to the identity of supporters, and I contrasted the 
potentially coercive approach to support under the MCA with the highly consensual model favoured 
by the General Comment.  The CRPD has focused attention on models of supported decision making 
where individuals exercise high levels of control over who supports them and how they are supported. 
One such model was developed in a pilot project by the Office of the Public Advocate (2011) in South 
Australia.  People with intellectual disabilities, brain injuries or neurological disease chose a trusted 
individual to support them and make written ͚suppoƌt agreements͛ that speĐified those aƌeas ǁheƌe 
they wanted support in decision making and how they wanted to be supported.  These could be 
tailoƌed to the iŶdiǀidual͛s pƌefeƌeŶĐes; foƌ eǆaŵple, theǇ ŵight speĐifǇ ͞Remind me to look forward 
and think of the future͟ or ͞ [Listen] to me first and try and understand͟ (Office of the Public Advocate, 
2011, p. 35).   
The Personal Ombudsmen (PO) scheme, developed in Skåne, Sweden, by users of mental health 
services, is also often cited in the literature.  POs are professionals – typically lawyers or social workers 
with no allegiance to psychiatry or social services – that work entirelǇ oŶ theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ ĐoŵŵissioŶ.  
Jesperson (2013) ƌepoƌts that ĐlieŶts͛ fiƌst pƌioƌities aƌe often ͞existential͟ matters, and may not be 
the same as those of services and relatives.  PO͛s ŵust ďe ǁilliŶg to disĐuss these ŵatteƌs aŶd ƌesist 
the urge to simply ͞fix͟ things; after many months clients may trust their PO sufficiently to request 
help from them. 
                                                          
48 Although the CRPD Committee do not follow this distinction in the GC, referring to a wide range of supports 
as ͚suppoƌted deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg͛, iŶĐludiŶg those that I haǀe ƌefeƌƌed to heƌe as ͚faĐilitated deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg͛.  “ee 
also Gooding (2015) for discussion of this issue. 
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An evaluation of the South Australian pilot study found that it prevented entry into guardianship and 
many people successfully applied foƌ ͚adŵiŶistƌatioŶ oƌdeƌs͛ to ŵaŶage theiƌ pƌopeƌtǇ aŶd affaiƌs to 
be lifted (Wallace, 2012).  Studies of the PO system found clear benefits to clients in terms of 
meaningful occupations, social contacts and reductions in symptoms of psychiatric illness (Engman et 
al., 2008, p. 23).  An economic analysis found that the PO scheme delivered significant savings because 
of the reduced need for crisis interventions and other services (Nilsson, 2006).  These findings suggest 
that being able to choose and shape relationships of support can play a vital role in building trust, 
which in turn increases the likelihood that they will effectively foster personal autonomy.  This is a 
clear strength of support paradigm. 
The General Comment requires states to provide legal frameworks that offer formal legal recognition 
to a support person chosen by the individual (para. 25(d)) and several jurisdictions already offer such 
frameworks.49 Formalising support has several attractions. It should give supporters greater leverage 
when accessing iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ the peƌsoŶ͛s ďehalf oƌ helping them to communicate their views.  It 
may be easier to detect and respond to exploitation and abuse in formalised support relationships 
(Carter & Chesterman, 2009).  Procedural safeguards can potentially be built into formalised supports; 
foƌ eǆaŵple, ͚‘epƌeseŶtatioŶ AgƌeeŵeŶts͛ iŶ British Columbia, Canada, allow a person to appoint a 
͚ŵoŶitoƌ͛ to ŵoŶitoƌ the aĐtiǀities of theiƌ ĐhoseŶ ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe.  Legislating for supported decisions 
can also clarify where legal responsibility for supported decisions lie – a key concern under the MCA, 
as we saw in the case of V.50 
However, informality may also be attractive in certain situations.  The success of the PO scheme in 
gaining trust is attributed, in part, to its strong guarantees of confidentiality – no third party is 
informed that a peƌsoŶ is usiŶg a PO͛s seƌǀiĐes, aŶd all papeƌǁoƌk is ƌetained by the client not the PO.  
This would be hard to replicate in a system where supporters had to be registered with an external 
body and submit to their monitoring.  Instruments that allow supporteƌs to aĐt as a peƌsoŶ͛s legal 
                                                          
49 In Canada: Representation Agreement Act 1996 (British Columbia, Canada); The Adult Guardianship and 
Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta, Canada); The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act 2000 
(Saskatchewan, Canada); Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, 2003 (Yukon, Canada).   Similar 
frameworks may soon follow in Ireland (Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 (Ireland)) and Australia 
follow (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2014; Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2012). 
50 For example, s6(1) of the Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act (2008) (Alberta, Canada) states that ͚A 
decision made with the assistance of a supporter or communicated by or with the assistance of a supporter is 
the deĐisioŶ of the suppoƌted adult foƌ all puƌposes͛. 
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representative51 may also increase their potential to misƌepƌeseŶt a peƌsoŶ͛s deĐisioŶs iŶ legal 
transactions; for this reason Article 12(4) calls for safeguards to ensure that measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person and protect against 
exploitation and abuse.  Legislating for support relationships can, in other words, change their 
character – both for better and for worse – and has knock on consequences on whether and how they 
foster autonomy. 
The suppoƌt paƌadigŵ does ƌaise diffiĐult ŵetaphǇsiĐal ƋuestioŶs aďout ͚oǁŶeƌship͛ of a deĐisioŶ, as 
discussed in relation to the case of V.  Responding to this kind of concern, Silvers and Francis (2009, p. 
485) argue that supporters should be viewed as a prosthesis for thinking, whereby their ͞reasoning 
aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg ĐaŶ eǆeĐute paƌt oƌ all of a suďjeĐt͛s oǁŶ thiŶkiŶg pƌoĐesses͟.  Accordingly, they 
argue, we should attribute the functioning of the prosthesis to the agent using them: ͞The racer, not 
the metal foot, is taken to be running the race͟ (p. 486).  Yet as Arstein-Kerslake (2014) observes, 
supporters – unlike prostheses – have minds of their own.  It seems doubtful that supported decisions 
can somehow be cleansed of the personality and values of the support person as “ilǀeƌs aŶd FƌaŶĐis͛ 
model seems to suggest.  The framing of choices always potentially alters the resultant decision; 
influence is inescapable for everyone (Quigley, 2013; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003).  Yet logically, framing 
effects cannot always impair autonomous agency, or we should never be autonomous.  The critical 
question is: when does ͚iŶflueŶĐe͛ thƌeateŶ autheŶtiĐ ageŶĐǇ?  IŶ legal teƌŵs, the CRPD contains a 
distinction that is also found in EŶglish laǁ, ďetǁeeŶ iŶflueŶĐe aŶd ͚uŶdue iŶflueŶĐe͛.  Yet defining the 
poiŶt at ǁhiĐh iŶflueŶĐe ďeĐoŵes ͚uŶdue͛ is Ŷo easǇ ŵatteƌ, aŶd is disĐussed ďeloǁ. 
Self-binding directives and co-decision making 
Although the support paradigm is generally highly consensual, the literature endorses instruments 
that give advance consent to measures that may conflict with a peƌsoŶ͛s expressed will and 
preferences in the future (Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2014; Minkowitz, 2013b).  The best known of 
these ͚self-binding direĐtiǀes͛ aƌe UlǇsses agƌeeŵeŶts52, where a person can specify what treatment 
or non-treatment they would like at a point in the future when they might change their mind.  Ulysses 
agreements are based upon two connected ideas: firstly, that autonomy is diachronic, and we can 
                                                          
51 Such as Representation Agreements, see n49 
52 So named after legendary Greek hero Ulysses (Odysseus), who wanted to hear the song of the sirens although 
it would render him incapable of rational thought and draw him to self-destruction.  He asked his men to tie him 
to the mast of his ship as they sailed past the sirens, to plug their ears with wax and not to untie him whatever 
he might say (Bielby, 2014; Dresser, 1982; Radoilska, 2012). 
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enhance autonomous agency by binding our future selves; secondly, that interpersonal dynamics are 
a key element of self-determination, and we can deploy others to promote our own diachronic 
autonomy through ͞empowering kinds of reliance on others͟ (Radoilska, 2011, p. 266).  Ulysses 
agƌeeŵeŶts do Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ƌeƋuiƌe a peƌsoŶ to ďe ͚iŶĐoŵpeteŶt͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to Đoŵe iŶto effeĐt 
(Bielby, 2014).  They can present ͞ethical hazards͟ ďeĐause theǇ ƌeƋuiƌe a peƌsoŶ͛s pƌeseŶtlǇ 
expressed wishes to be overruled; for example Walton (2003) gives the example of birth plans that 
prohibit the administration of pain relief even if a woman in labour later requests it.  Dresser (1982) 
questions whether Ulysses agreements are as non-paternalistic as they aspire to be, highlighting the 
absence of any non-arbitrary basis for choosing which set of preferences – past or present – others 
are to treat as binding.   Careful consideration needs to be given to when self-binding directives come 
into effect and how they can be revoked if the CRPD moves away from a mental capacity based model; 
ǁhat disaďilitǇ Ŷeutƌal Đƌiteƌia Đould ďe used to pƌefeƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s deĐisioŶ at oŶe tiŵe oǀeƌ aŶotheƌ? 
Co-decision making agreements rest on a similar logic to Ulysses agreements.  They are provided for 
in several Canadian jurisdictions (James & Watts, 2014), and may soon be adopted in Ireland53 and 
Australia (Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2012).  A person nominates a co-decision maker through 
a formal agreement, usually requiring court authorization.  Once in force, only acts that are agreed by 
both the person and their co-decision maker have legal force.  Sometimes co-decision makers must 
acquiesce to a peƌsoŶ͛s deĐisioŶs if a reasonable person could have made it.54 
Because of the potential for co-deĐisioŶ ŵakeƌs to ǀeto a peƌsoŶ͛s ĐhoiĐes, theǇ aƌe said to leaŶ ͚ŵoƌe 
closely to a substituted decision-ŵakiŶg ŵodel͛ (James & Watts, 2014, p. 58).  Yet they are potentially 
useful for people who trust a third party to make decisions on their behalf but who wish to remain 
involved and informed and retain the ability to veto decisions that they do not agree with.  They might 
potentially be useful for people who sometimes make impulsive decisions that they later regret, who 
would like a tƌusted thiƌd paƌtǇ to ͚sigŶ off͛ oŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt legal deĐisioŶs.  Like Ulysses agreements, 
questions may arise as to how easily a person can dismantle a co-decision making agreement.  At 
present most statutes require a person to have the mental capacity to do so.  A move away from a 
mental capacity standard would need to carefully consider how to strike an appropriate balance 
ďetǁeeŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s aďilitǇ to eǆtƌiĐate theŵselǀes fƌoŵ aŶ agƌeeŵeŶt that ǁas Ŷot ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ theŵ 
                                                          
53 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 (Ireland)  
54 s17(2) The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act 2000 (Saskatchewan, Canada); see also s19 
Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 (Ireland) 
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without making them so easy to dismantle it undermined the entire purpose of an instrument 
designed to iron out fluctuations in expression of agency. 
Facilitated decision making 
Facilitated decision making is one of the most conceptually challenging elements of the support 
paradigm.  It was first developed by Bach and Kerzner (2010) for situations where there was nobody 
iŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s life ǁho Đould ƌeliaďlǇ uŶdeƌstaŶd their communication in order to support them to make 
deĐisioŶs.  BaĐh aŶd KeƌzŶeƌ͛s ŵodel pƌoposes that a thiƌd party (a ͞facilitator͟) takes ͞needed 
decisions͟ oŶ the peƌsoŶ͛s ďehalf, ďut ďases theiƌ deĐisioŶs oŶ theiƌ kŶoǁledge of a peƌsoŶ͛s 
͞narrative͟.  Facilitated decisions may comprise elements that aƌe siŵilaƌ to ͚suďstituted judgeŵeŶt͛ 
approaches, taking into aĐĐouŶt a peƌsoŶ͛s past kŶoǁŶ ǀalues, ďeliefs aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes (Flynn & 
Arstein-Kerslake, 2014), but they are also sensitive to present expressions of agency, even if they might 
Ŷot ďe ƌegaƌded as ͚ ƌatioŶal͛ or ͚ ĐoŵpeteŶt͛.  For example, the kiŶds of ͚ pƌaĐtiĐal͛ aŶd ͚ Đƌeatiǀe͛ ageŶĐǇ 
Boyle (2014) describes people with dementia exercising.  Quinn (2011) writes of obligations ͞to spark 
the expression  of  their  will  and  preference  through  time͟. 
Understanding why facilitated decisions aƌe Ŷot ͚suďstitute deĐisioŶs͛, aŶd theƌeďǇ pƌohiďited ǁithiŶ 
the support paradigm, requires a careful reading of the General Comment.  Facilitated decisions would 
not fall within its threefold definition of substitute decisions55 provided they did not void any 
discernible efforts to exercise legal agency, did not involve appointing a facilitated decision maker 
agaiŶst the peƌsoŶ͛s ǁill, and any decisions were made on the basis of the faĐilitatoƌ͛s ͞best 
interpretation͟ of the peƌsoŶ͛s ǁill aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes, ƌatheƌ thaŶ theiƌ oďjeĐtiǀe ͚ďest iŶteƌests͛ 
(General Comment, para. 18bis).  Such approaches are described as ŵoƌe ͚iŶteŶsiǀe͛ foƌŵs of support 
(paras. 15-16 and 25(b)).   
It is important to consider the positioning of facilitated decisions within the wider political context of 
the CRPD.  During the negotiations of the Convention, the International Disability Caucus resisted any 
language that might legitimize guaƌdiaŶship, suĐh as peƌŵittiŶg ͚suďstitute deĐisioŶs͛ iŶ eǆĐeptioŶal 
Đases.  TheǇ pƌoposed iŶstead that soŵetiŵes it ŵight ďe ŶeĐessaƌǇ to pƌoǀide ͞ϭϬϬ% suppoƌt͟.56  
Consequently in some places in the literature on the CRPD, facilitated decisions seem to be treated as 
a person actively exercising legal agency with support, rather than a third party taking decisions on 
their behalf (e.g. Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, 2014, p. 96; World Association for Psychosocial 
Rehabilitation, 2014).  These evoke the strong metaphysical claim made by Silvers and Francis that 
                                                          
55 At para. 23 
56 See the travaux préparatoires for 18 January 2006(UN Enable, 2010). 
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supporters could potentially exercise ͞all of a suďjeĐt͛s oǁŶ thiŶkiŶg pƌoĐesses͟57 and yet the person 
and not the supporter would be regarded as the agent making the decision. 
Others – myself included - pƌefeƌ to tƌeat ͞ ϭϬϬ% suppoƌt͟ as a ͚ legal fiĐtioŶ͛ rather than a metaphysical 
reality, and prefer a clearer recognition that the facilitator – not the person themselves – is taking the 
decision (Booth Glen, 2012; Canadian Association for Community Living, 2014; Gooding, 2015; Mental 
Disability Advocacy Center, 2014; People with Disability Australia et al., 2014; Quinn, 2010).  Facilitated 
decisions take place because we are uncertain as to what a person wants; they call for interpretation 
(General Comment, para. 18bis).  It is important to recognize that facilitators have considerable power 
to alteƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s ͚Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͛ thƌough theiƌ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ.  They will get it wrong sometimes; if the 
person later on becomes able to communicate their wishes, it seems nonsensical to tell them that the 
decision was their own, especially if they do not recognize it as one which they would have made.  
Recognizing that facilitated decisions are decisions that have been made on behalf of the person, not 
by them, keeps in view these important epistemic considerations and the power and responsibility of 
facilitators.  It is perhaps in recognition of these factors that BaĐh aŶd KeƌzŶeƌ͛s ŵodel iŶĐludes ŵoƌe 
stringent safeguards for facilitators than supporters, and prohibits them from making certain decisions 
where there is a high risk of abuse or exploitation. 
Facilitated decision making stretches the concept of RA to its limits.   It relies upon others being able 
to ͞tell a coherent story about who we are͟ (Bach & Kerzner, 2010, p. 65).  The epistemic issues in 
facilitated decision making are no less considerable than those of dialogical mental capacity 
assessment.  The support paradigm does not purport to offer tools to magically overcome this.  Rather, 
facilitated decisions entail (at least) three separate moral obligations. First, to strive for the best 
interpretation we can – albeit this may be very difficult – of what a person wants or would have 
wanted.  Second, to maximize their potential to express what they want more clearly.  Thirdly, having 
come to our best interpretation of what they want, to convert that into legal effect on their behalf.  
This differs from best interests.  Some best interests decision makers do go to great lengths to make 
the decision the person themselves would have made58.  But as Hayden J put it recently in a case 
where he had gone to great lengths to understand the possible wishes of a man in a minimally 
ĐoŶsĐious state, ͚͚Wishes' and 'best interests' should never be conflated, they are entirely separate 
                                                          
57 Emphasis mine 
58 Westminster City Council v Sykes [2014] EWHC B9 (COP) 
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matters͛59.  Best interests decision makers are not bound by their best interpretation of what a person 
wants or would have wanted, facilitators are. 
Hard cases: risk and harm 
A common criticism of the support paradigm is that it offers few tools to mitigate harmful decisions 
(Kohn & Blumenthal, 2013; Ward, 2014).  The literature embraces disaďled peoples͛ ƌight to a ͞dignity 
of risk͟ (Gooding, 2012).  It focuses on non-coercive interventions that could mitigate risks, counters 
steƌeotǇpes of ͚ daŶgeƌousŶess͛ aŶd interrogates ͞ the impulse towards protection͟ (Minkowitz, 2013a, 
p. 17).  It also highlights the risks of abuse and exploitation that guardianship and mental health laws 
themselves pose (Dhanda, 2006-7).  However, there is growing recognition that there will be 
͚tƌouďliŶg͛ situatioŶs ǁheƌe a peƌsoŶ͛s aĐts oƌ ĐhoiĐes plaĐe them at serious risk, risks that they do not 
understand, where the support paradigm offers no clear or obvious solutions. Gooding (2015), for 
eǆaŵple, Ƌuotes fƌoŵ Faƌƌ͛s (1982) first person account of psychosis, where she believed that only by 
jumping from the seventh floor of a building and landing on her head would she receive the ultimate 
Enlightenment. 
The support paradigm is imbued with a desire to protect ͞psychiatrized persons and others from 
attributions of incapacity͟ based on ͞value-laden assessments of the risks and benefits at stake͟ 
(Wildeman, 2013, p. 60).  It is very difficult to think of legal principles and safeguards to cope with 
these dilemmas that would not provide a toehold for full blown guardianship and civil commitment 
regimes to creep back in.  Moreover, in discussing hard cases there is a danger that they will be 
rhetorically deployed as ͞extreme case formulations͟ (Pomerantz, 1986) to legitimize the very 
practices the CRPD sought to eradicate.  And yet... these hard cases do exist, and when we are 
confronted with them we would hope that the support paradigm could supply some clear principles 
and safeguards for dealing with them.  To do otherwise risks situations of domination where the 
principles governing such interventions are unclear and arbitrary, and in common law jurisdictions 
creates space for the courts to develop paternalistic principles to fill any lacunae.60 
The literature on the support paradigm offers some tentative proposals for dealing with hard cases of 
risk, but these are difficult to reconcile with the General Comment – and, indeed, with each other.  
                                                          
59 Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TH & Anor [2014] EWCOP 4 §56.  See also paragraph 5.38 
of the MCA Code of PƌaĐtiĐe, ǁhiĐh states that ͚their wishes and feelings, beliefs and values will not necessarily 
be the deciding factor in working out their best interests.͛ 
60 As it did, for example, in Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1991] UKHL 1, the case that formed the basis of 
the MCA itself. 
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Bach and Kerzner͛s (2010, p. 140, p. 144) Serious Adverse Effects framework permits facilitators to 
intervene when a person ͞can no longer express his will and/or intentions in ways that would direct 
reasonable consequential action͟.  This appears to be a modified outcome approach: we identify the 
outcome we think a person really wants, based on our knowledge of them, and use that to guide 
interventions which they may resist ďeĐause theiƌ ďehaǀiouƌ is Ŷot ͚ƌeasoŶaďle͛ iŶ light of that 
preferred outcome.   
Recently the Canadian Association for Community Living (2014), whose Executive Vice-President is 
Michael Bach, seemed to endorse an ͞understand and appreciate͟ test to determine whether people 
͞know what they are doing, they are choosing dignity of sometimes substantial risk͟.  The Mental 
Disability Advocacy Center (2013)61 has also suggested a modified mental capacity approach, 
recommending removing the more overtly subjective elements of the functional test, suĐh as ͚use oƌ 
ǁeigh͛ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts, and requiring understanding of minimal information.  It might also be possible 
to restrict capacity assessments to situations of serious risk to avoid their permeating all of a peƌsoŶ͛s 
decisions. 
Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake (2014) suggest that in cases of serious self-harm those around a person 
could act ͚agaiŶst the eǆpliĐit iŶstƌuĐtioŶs of the peƌsoŶ ďeiŶg suppoƌted͛ iŶ eŵeƌgeŶcy situations 
͞ǁheƌe suppoƌtiŶg the peƌsoŶ͛s ǁishes ǁould ĐoŶstitute Điǀil oƌ ĐƌiŵiŶal ŶegligeŶĐe͟62 (p. 99).  By 
restricting such interventions to ͚eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ͛ situatioŶs, presumably this would not encompass the 
kiŶds of distal ƌisks pƌeseŶted iŶ DD aŶd T)͛s Đase.  TheǇ ƌeĐoŶĐile this positioŶ to the C‘PD͛s eŵphasis 
oŶ ƌespeĐtiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s ǁill aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes ďǇ aƌguiŶg that soŵetiŵes a peƌsoŶ͛s pƌeseŶt aĐts oƌ 
ǀeƌďal eǆpƌessioŶs diǀeƌge fƌoŵ theiƌ ͚tƌue͛ ǁill aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes; saying that third parties should 
͞support the individual by taking whatever actions are necessary to augment her decision-making 
ability to a point at which she can clearly express her will and preferences͟ (p. 98). 
Each of these approaches rests on the plausible intuition that that sometimes we experience 
temporary disturbances in authentic and autonomous agency.  Yet they also confer epistemic 
privilege, and thereby power, upon others, in assuming that they will be able to accurately detect 
these disturbances, and intervene accordingly.  Any law that legitimates interventions on these 
                                                          
61 Foƌ aŶ eǆaŵple of a ͚ŵiŶiŵal͛ requirement for understanding for consent to sex, see s5A(4) Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences) (Amendment) Bill 2014 (Ireland) 
62 Presumably this would not be the civil and criminal laws of negligence as they are currently defined in England 
and Wales, since these are predicated on mental incapacity, as are similar positive obligations under human 
rights law, see: Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough Council & Ors [2003] UKHL 47; [2004] 1 AC 46; Rabone & Anor 
v Pennine Care NHS Foundation [2012] UKSC 2 and Arskaya v Ukraine (App no 45076/05) [2013] ECHR 1235. 
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grounds necessarily positions others as sometimes knowing ourselves better than we do, with all the 
epistemic uncertainty and power relations this entails.  Without wishing to dismiss the claim that 
sometimes others are aďle to ideŶtifǇ situatioŶs ǁheƌe ǁe aƌe ͚Ŷot ouƌselǀes͛, it is not immediately 
oďǀious that a Đlaiŵ to kŶoǁ a peƌsoŶ͛s true will and preferences better than they do is a preferable 
basis for coercive intervention, or is any less prone to subjective and arbitrary interpretation, than 
mental incapacity and best interests, or even risk. 
The CRPD injects another element, however, into hard cases.  It calls for recognition that vulnerability 
and risk is a universal phenomenon with a complex aetiology, and is not limited to people with 
disabilities or mental disorders (Clough, 2014; Scully, 2014).  On this view, the CRPD calls for a disability 
neutral response to risk and vulnerability.  There are examples in English law of generic obligations to 
protect vulnerable persons from self-inflicted harm, such as the duty to prevent prisoner suicides, 
even if the prisoner has no mental disorder.63  IncreasinglǇ the Đouƌts͛ ͚iŶheƌeŶt juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛ is used to 
iŶteƌǀeŶe iŶ situatioŶs ǁheƌe people haǀe ͚ŵeŶtal ĐapaĐitǇ͛ ďut aƌe ƌegaƌded as ǀulŶeƌaďle as a ƌesult 
of their situation (Szerletics, 2011).  This offers a potential model for disability neutral interventions 
(Clough, 2014).   
However, the possibility of non-consensual interventions for those without mental disorders has 
caused consternation among some liberal theorists (Christman, 2004; Holroyd, 2009) and indeed the 
general public (Department of Health, 2013).  Requirements for disability neutrality also potentially 
ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith oldeƌ iŶteƌŶatioŶal huŵaŶ ƌights iŶstƌuŵeŶts that ƌeƋuiƌe aŶ eǆpliĐit fiŶdiŶg of ͚ŵeŶtal 
disoƌdeƌ͛ foƌ ĐoeƌĐiǀe iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs, aŶd the idea of laǁs peƌŵittiŶg pƌeǀeŶtiǀe deteŶtioŶ on a generic 
basis has raised concerns of political abuse (Bartlett, 2012a; Fennell and Khaliq, 2011).  The CRPD 
forces us to confront the question: why are measures to mitigate risk and vulnerability that are 
considered acceptable when imposed on people with mental disabilities considered unacceptable if 
imposed on the population as a whole (Bartlett, 2012b)?  Perhaps if interventions were framed in 
terms that could potentially affect anybody, we would proceed with greater caution. 
Hard cases: undue influence 
Proponents of the support paradigm and critics alike have expressed concern about the potential for 
undue influence, exploitation and abuse by supporters (Carter & Chesterman, 2009; Kohn & 
Blumenthal, 2013; Minkowitz, 2013b; Ward, 2011).  These echo the intuition in the RA literature that 
                                                          
63 Commissioners of Police for the Metropolis v Reeves [1999] UKHL 35; [2000] 1 AC 360.  Although, this does sit 
in tension with cases finding that there are no grounds to forcibly feed a prisoner who stages a hunger strike, 
ďeĐause he is of ͚souŶd ŵiŶd͛ Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam. 127. 
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external conditions of duress, manipulation and coercion can impair authentic expressions of 
autonomy (Ashley, 2013; Stoljar, 2013).  The case of G, described above, is a good example of the 
kinds of situations we are concerned with here.  These are issues that potentially affect all people 
(Gooding, 2015), but as the General Comment acknowledges ͞may be exacerbated for those who rely 
on the supports of others to make decisions͟ (para. 18ter).  Article 12(4) CRPD requires safeguards to 
eŶsuƌe that all ŵeasuƌes ƌelatiŶg to the eǆeƌĐise of legal ĐapaĐitǇ ŵust ͚prevent abuse͛ aŶd eŶsuƌe 
that they ͞respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and 
undue influence͟. 
Undue influence is notoriously difficult to define64, raising difficult questions about when we should 
regard influence as undue.  The General Comment characterises it as ͞where the quality of the 
interaction between the support person and the person being supported includes signs of fear, 
aggression, threat, deception or manipulation͟ (para. 18ter).65  The General Comment͛s focus on the 
interaction rather than the outcome of the decision resembles procedural accounts of RA which aspire 
to value-neutrality (Stoljar, 2013). TheǇ also haǀe paƌallels ǁith ͚disĐuƌsiǀe ĐoŶtƌol͛ aĐĐouŶts of 
freedom, which Craigie (2015) argues could offer practical guidelines for the support paradigm.  
Importantly, on this interaction/procedural view of undue influence, support would not be regarded 
as ͚uŶdue͛ siŵplǇ ďeĐause a peƌsoŶ ƌelied eǆteŶsiǀelǇ upoŶ otheƌs foƌ suppoƌt, nor because they had 
arrived at a decision that others regarded as harmful, or because others disapproved of their choice 
of support person. 
The General Comment͛s definition of undue influence appears to capture cases like London Borough 
of Redbridge v G, where G͛s decisions could easily be viewed as a product of fear, aggression and 
manipulation by C and F.  Conversely it would not capture situations like V v R, where V͛s mother did 
potentially exercise great influence over her, but this interaction was not characterized by aggression, 
manipulation or deceit.  Other MCA cases oŶ ͚uŶdue iŶflueŶĐe͛ might come out differently, however, 
on an interaction approach.  For example, in A Primary Care Trust v P it was held that P͛s ǀieǁs ǁeƌe 
so ͚unhealthily enmeshed͛ ǁith those of his mother that he lacked mental capacity66 - but it is unclear 
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65 This definition is more expansive than the equitable doĐtƌiŶe of ͚uŶdue iŶflueŶĐe͛ iŶ EŶglish ĐoŶtƌaĐt laǁ, 
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descriptions of these doctrines in contract law, see Peel (2011). 
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that this reflected concerns about fear, aggression or manipulation so much as her having too much 
influence whilst being regarded as a bad influence. 
In English law, contracts entered into under undue influence or duress can be set aside, but the 
affected individual must take steps to do this.  Some jurisdictions with formalized support agreements 
ƌeƋuiƌe thiƌd paƌties to disƌegaƌd ͚ suppoƌted deĐisioŶs͛ if theǇ haǀe ƌeasoŶaďle gƌouŶds to ďelieǀe that 
the supporter exercised undue influence, or there was fraud or misrepresentation on their part.67  
Safeguards could be developed whereby – as is the case in English law – where there is a presumption 
of undue influence by a supporter, it must be rebutted, for example by showing that the person had 
been given access to independent advice (Peel, 2011, para. 10-026).  Similar mechanisms might also 
be useful for situations where there is concern that supporters with ͚ĐoŶfliĐts of iŶteƌest͛ may have 
taken advantage of their position.  It will be extremely hard to avoid conflicts of interest in supporters, 
since many will either have personal connections or may potentially provide them with services for 
remuneration, so techniques for managing them will be essential. 
By definition, people in situations of undue influence will haǀe diffiĐultǇ eǆpƌessiŶg theiƌ ͚tƌue͛ ǁill aŶd 
preferences and may, like G, be too scared to ask for assistance.  How should a paradigm that is 
premised on maximum respect for will and preferences respond in situations of suspected undue 
influence, exploitation and abuse, where the person themselves indicates a preference to remain in 
that situation?  IŶ these situatioŶs, it is diffiĐult to Ŷaǀigate the suppoƌt paƌadigŵ͛s eŵďƌaĐe of a 
dignity of risk in allowing a person to choose to enter into potentially harmful relationships, and its 
emphasis on recognizing ͚tƌue͛ eǆpƌessioŶs of ǁill.  The General Comment itself specifies that 
safeguaƌds to pƌoteĐt agaiŶst uŶdue iŶflueŶĐe ͚must also respect the rights, will and preferences of 
the person, including the right to take risks and make mistakes͛ ;para. 18ter).  As yet, the literature on 
how to proceed in these situations is limited. 
Arstein-Kerslake (2014) outliŶes a Đase studǇ of ͚Joe͛, ǁho has high suppoƌt Ŷeeds aŶd ǁhose fatheƌ 
heavily influences his decisions and sometimes acts paternalistically towards him.  Following a 
teŵpoƌaƌǇ spell iŶ ƌespite Đaƌe it is deĐided that it is Ŷot iŶ Joe͛s ďest iŶteƌests to ƌetuƌŶ to liǀe ǁith 
his father, but Joe still wishes to return there.  Arstein-Kerslake contends that the state has a role in 
ensuring that Joe has the necessary support to understand that other options than living with his 
father exist, but that ͞if he ultiŵatelǇ Đhose to ƌeŵaiŶ iŶ his fatheƌ͛s hoŵe, uŶdeƌ his fatheƌ͛s ĐoŶtƌol, 
that decision must be respected͟ (p. 11).    Arstein-Keƌslake͛s Đase studǇ illuŵiŶates hoǁ the ͚digŶitǇ 
of ƌisk͛ eǆteŶds to ĐhoiĐes to eŶgage iŶ ĐoŶtƌolliŶg oƌ otheƌǁise ƌiskǇ ƌelatioŶships.   
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The case study evokes both A Primary Care Trust v P, where P continued to express a preference to 
live with his mother even after experiencing other living options, and LBX v K where L expressed a 
preference not to return to his father͛s care after experiencing life elsewhere.  The analysis rests on 
allowing a person to make an informed choice between different options; yet experience suggests 
that sometimes it can be extremely difficult to support a person to make such an informed choice if 
access to them is impeded by others.   IŶ G͛s Đase, foƌ eǆaŵple, those ĐoŶĐeƌŶed foƌ heƌ ǁelfaƌe fouŶd 
it almost impossible to visit her without C being present, and any information they managed to convey 
about the alternative support options available to her was contradicted by C.   If we are to take 
seriously the idea that a person in this position must be given support to make a truly informed choice, 
in some exceptional cases stronger legal tools for intervention may be required.  Use of the ͚iŶheƌeŶt 
juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛ to ƌestƌaiŶ the aĐtioŶs of otheƌs ǁho ŵight iŵpede a peƌsoŶ͛s autoŶoŵous ĐhoiĐes – for 
example, through non-molestation orders68 or orders pƌohiďitiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s faŵilǇ fƌoŵ ŵakiŶg 
arrangements for her marriage without her consent69 - might provide a potential model.  As with the 
interventions described earlier, however, there is a danger that they could be used in ways that go 
against the ethos of the support paradigm, and would need to be carefully considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Examining the MCA through the lens of RA reveals that the MCA was built upon two conflicting 
premises: causation requirements are premised on the idea that autonomy is a function of a peƌsoŶ͛s 
individual psychological makeup, whilst the support principle and some parts of the case law on undue 
influence and mental capacity are based on the idea that sometimes autonomy can be affected by our 
external circumstances.  This unstable underpinning has resulted in somewhat contradictory rulings 
regarding mental capacity, support and relationships with others. 
The RA literature that has foĐused oŶ the MCA has ofteŶ takeŶ a ǀeƌǇ Ŷaƌƌoǁ appƌoaĐh to ͚suppoƌt͛, 
whilst the support paradigm of the CRPD offers refreshing ways of thinking about how relationships 
can foster diachronic and relational autonomy in the exercise of legal capacity.  Models such as co-
decision making, supported and facilitated decision making are rich with potential for more 
sophisticated RA theories. 
Yet both approaches to legal capacity are haunted by intractable epistemic difficulties.  Whether one 
is assessing mental capacity, making a facilitated decision, trying to decide whether self-harming 
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behaviour is a ŵaŶifestatioŶ of a peƌsoŶ͛s ͚tƌue͛ ǁill aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes oƌ deteƌŵiŶiŶg ǁhat to do iŶ 
cases of undue influence, there is significant scope for interpretation, and therefore uncertainty and 
subjective decisions.  This, in turn, confers considerable power and epistemic authority upon those 
responsible for such interpretations.  Both models of legal capacity oblige us to come to a view at 
some point about whether a person is exercising autonomous agency, albeit that their constructions 
of autonomy may differ.  It is difficult to see how these issues can be avoided. 
The CRPD has revived old debates about the legitimacy of non-consensual interventions, and poses 
new questions about the nature of disability and how people with impairments might best be enabled 
to exercise their rights on an equal basis with others.  The CRPD does not of itself answer every 
question it poses – what human rights instrument does?  Instead, as Wildeman (2013) comments, it 
has an expressive function, and creates an opening for discussions that challenge deeply entrenched 
practices and ways of thinking about legal subjectivity.  The CRPD also offers important new tools for 
approaching these discussions through its powerful focus on equality, autonomy and the external 
determinants of disablement, vulnerability and risk.  Perhaps most importantly of all, the CRPD insists 
that deliberation of policies and laws relating to people with disabilities actively involve them,70 rather 
thaŶ ďeiŶg delegated to the ǀeƌǇ ͚eǆpeƌts͛ theǇ so often empower. 
There is only a very sparse literature on the experiences of people who are subject to guardianship 
and mental capacity laws;71 this urgently needs remedying.  If it is anything like the literature on 
subjective experiences of mental health laws, we should anticipate a diversity of views, but with a 
significant proportion feeling that coercive interventions were unjustified or unwelcome (for example, 
see: Katsakou and Priebe, 2006; Katsakou et al., 2010; Katsakou et al., 2012; Priebe et al., 2010; Russo 
and Rose, 2013).  These studies also tell us that the quality of relationships plaǇ a keǇ ƌole iŶ people͛s 
experiences of such interventions (Gilburt et al., 2008).  RA approaches do not lead us to a clearly 
defined set of practices, but they do suggest that the law can no longer approach questions of legal 
capacity as a matter of individual rationality.  
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